Government Control
of Confederate Railroads |
An impartial observer could have
easily seen the major weaknesses of the Confederate railroads at the
start of the war: |
|
1. Insufficient rolling stock |
|
2. Many roads did not connect in cities |
|
3. No manufacturer of rails, rolling stock and
other railroad supplies |
|
4. Insufficient sources of iron and other
essential metals |
|
5. Lack of redundant east-west and north-south
routes |
|
6. Schedules not coordinated to provide the
fastest possible travel |
|
7. Few lines of railroads serving the likely
areas of combat |
|
8. The belief by the government that the
railroads should handle their own problems |
|
Other weaknesses were just as important,
but not so obvious: |
|
9. Most railroads were partially, or wholly,
owned by their states |
|
10. Railroads were unwilling to loose
control over their rolling stock |
|
11. Devotion to "State's Rights" would
prevent prompt agreement to solve railroad problems |
|
12. Lack of labor for the many construction
projects that would be required |
|
13. Lack of coin and currency to pay the
huge costs of the war, including transportation |
|
Each of the above weaknesses would provide serious
obstacles to keeping the Confederate armies and cities supplied with the
essentials for winning the war. |
President Davis had the issues of railroads impressed on
him during his trip from Montgomery to Richmond in late May, 1861. The
trip required travel over 8 railroad companies' tracks, one change of
gage, at least 5 changes of cars and one ferry ride. He had travel 850
miles to cover a trip that would require 690 miles on today's interstate
highway system. The extra 160 miles, along with the gage/car changes and
ferry trip, would have required one entire day longer than would have
been required if the railroads had been built for long distance travel
(such as Richmond to New Orleans). |
Unfortunately for the Confederacy, Davis was immediately
swamped with military matters, especially the anticipated Union
advance on Richmond, and did not give railroad matters attention until
July 18th, when Davis appointed Wilmington & Weldon RR President William
S. Ashe as the first superintendent of transportation of troops and
military stores on all the rail roads, north and south, in the
Confederate States. |
|
Ashe quickly found that a presidential appointment did not
confer the authority necessary to accomplish his mission of providing
the necessary transportation for the army. Of the above problems, only
#6 was one he could directly influence. Of the others, Ashe's political
experience allowed him to impact #1, but only slightly, and #'s 9, 10,
and 11 stymied him. |
The first serious attempt to improve the support for the
railroads' operations surfaced during the December 1861 meeting in
Richmond of the President and Superintendents of the Virginia and North
Carolina railroads. After assigning tasks, the convention meet again in
early January to finalize their proposals. As was the understanding of
how business and government should relate to each other, Ashe was not
invited to the meeting. The convention provided a written report to the
Secretary of War so that their could be better coordination between
private and public efforts. Half way down the report was the proposal
that the government provide capacity at private mines and foundries to
allow those works to handle railroad requirements. Next came the useless
proposal that private investors should build foundries and rolling mills
and should received Government assistance (money only was mentioned). Of
course, the higher prices required for the small Southern new
construction to operate would make these businesses too expensive for
success after the war and would quickly fail. |
A much more serious convention was quickly called and met
February 5-7, with Major Ashe participating. This meeting included
representatives from several western railroads, as well as the eastern
ones. The primary proposal approved by the convention was the division
of the railroad system into four divisions, each of which would
establish a rolling mill and such machine shops and foundries as
required by that division. The railroads of each division would fund the
creation of the rolling mill for that division and the presidents of
those railroads would act as the Board of Directors for the mill.
Nothing was mentioned about the government allowing the mines to provide
metal for their work nor the government allowing men to be released from
the army to man the new works. The plan developed was reasonable, and
could have made a significant impact on railroad operations --- IF the
government had been whole-heartedly behind it, providing men, materials
and transportation to support the mills. |
It was clear to someone (Ashe?) that letting the railroads
"do their own thing" was not going to meet the needs of the nation.
Ashe's experiences with five railroad conventions convinced someone to
write a proposed bill for a reorganization of the railroads' support to
the army. As explained by Black in The Railroads of the Confederacy,
pp. 97-98, in mid-March, 1862, both the Confederate House and Senate
passed resolutions directing the Military Affairs Committees "to inquire
whether further legislation is necessary to give increased efficiency to
our interior lines of railroads."
|
The House Committee was the first to report out a Bill --
the first attempt by the Congress to provide a scheme of railroad
regulation. Its clauses were enough to delight those desiring
centralized control. They provided for "a military chief of railroad
transportation," with the rank of lieutenant colonel, to be appointed by
the President from the railroad officers of the Confederacy on the basis
of judgment, skill, and experience in practical transportation matters.
As his immediate assistants a number of district military
superintendents were to be selected, each to hold the rank of Major and
to be charged with the supervision of a specific portion of the railroad
system. The bill would invest all railroad officials with
military rank, and military responsibilities, to and including
conductors, station agents, and section masters. It required the
establishment of through schedules for government freight and the
interchange of cars under public control. |
As Black states, this was a real attack on the problem,
though who devised the system and assisted in writing the bill remains
unknown, though both Ashe and William M. Wadley (the next army railroad
superintendent) were both in Richmond and may well have worked on the
bill together. After the Bill's presentation to the House, a torrent of
abuse was unleashed on the concepts behind the bill, resulting
eventually in the complete gutting of the bill's twelve sections,
reducing them to one. The emasculated bill was passed and sent to the
Senate, where it died a quiet death with the end of the session of the
Congress. |
|
As the summer of 1862 arrived, the Confederacy had no one
in specific "control" over the nation's railroads -- Ashe had resigned
and Colonel Myers, the Quartermaster General determined to handle
transportation matters himself, with Captain Mason Morfit (a lawyer) as
his only assistant. |
To no surprise, the railroad issues increased in number and
seriousness. The deterioration of the railroads had not become serious,
but refusing to solve basic problems made them worse. Several critical
railroad construction projects were started by the government, but the
assistance the government could provide was not forthcoming and the
railroads felt they had no advocate in Richmond.
|
On August 12, Secretary of War G. W. Randolph wrote
President Davis on the status of the War Department and matters that
would need attention. His last of a long item was "A right to control
the operations of our railroads to some extent is necessary to insure
quick and safe transportation and to maintain the roads in a proper
state of efficiency. The regular transportation of the roads is so much
deranged by the movements of troops and munitions of war that a common
head during the war is indispensable. I recommend that application be
made for authority to exercise such control as may be necessary to
harmonize the operations of the roads and to maintain their efficiency,
and to appoint a superintendent who shall be charged with the
supervision of railroad transportation."
|
|
By November, 1862, the transportation issue had become too
serious to ignore and President Davis, through the Secretary of War,
called Wadley to Richmond to discuss his taking the position of
Superintendent of Rail Road Transportation. He accepted and immediately
called for a convention of all railroad presidents and superintendents
in Augusta on December 15.
|
Forty-one railroads attended, covering
5,181 miles of track. The chairman read AIG's Special Order 98,
assigning Wadley to take supervision and control of the
transportation for the Government on all the Rail Roads in the
Confederate States. He would make contracts with the railroads and
make regulations and arrangements with them as required to secure
harmony and cooperation the part of the railroads. He would direct
all agents or employees hired by the Government in connection with
railroad transportation, take charge of and employ all engineers,
machinery, tools and other property of the Government owned or used
for railroad transportation and may exchange, sell or loan such
machinery to facilitate the work of transportation. He could require
cooperation and assistance to such an extent as can be reasonably
granted by the Quartermaster and Commissary Bureaus and may apply
for details from the army for such mechanics and workmen as may be
necessary to facilitate his duties. He would report through the
Adjutant and Inspector General to the Secretary of War. |
Having read the orders to Col. Wadley,
the chair then read Wadley's letter to the convention, in which he
said the convention had been called to present the railroads'
difficulties in providing transportation and to work out ways to
meet those problems. He specifically called for coordination of
schedules to arrange for connections that delayed transportation as
little as possible. He proposed to part with all rolling stock the
Government had to those roads most in need of additional rolling
stock. He requested railroads with plenty of rolling stock to assist
nearby roads that were short of such stock. He requested the roads
should form an agreement regarding interchange between roads and,
once the agreement had been agreed to, it would be rigidly enforced.
He also asked the convention not to adjourn before the issues raised
had been fully resolved. |
The convention then took up the business
of most importance to the railroads -- setting new freight rates and
improving punctuality of Government payment for freight and
passengers carried. |
Once the money issues had been settled,
several resolutions were adopted by the convention. First, the
Superintendents of the rail roads would act as assistants to Wadley
on matters concerning their roads. Second, those roads partially in
the hands of the enemy, or greatly destroyed by them, and those in
the Trans-Mississippi were exempted from the rate agreement just
made. |
The convention then pledged to work with
Wadley to solve issues that would arrive, and then the convention
adjourned. But the railroads appeared to have been wary of
government assistance, as nothing had been done on the government
side to support the creation of the rolling mills proposed eight
months before. The railroads had, in several small conventions, made
steps to locate the sites for the rolling mills, but nothing had
progressed from there (there being no railroad superintendent at the
government level during those months to keep the momentum going). |
Wadley's frustration over the
convention's hasty adjournment and the refusal to work out the
specific problems and their solutions came to the surface in a
circular letter to all the railroad presidents who had attended,
dated the day after the convention adjourned. "Having failed at the recent meeting
of Presidents and Superintendents of Railroads in the Confederate
States, to agree upon a definite plan for carrying on Government
Transportation, over the several Railroads of the country, and
deeming it of the first importance that some system should be agreed
upon, by which all will act in harmony, I respectfully submit and
ask your concurrence and agreement to the following:" |
Your superintendent will act as my
assistant, without compensation, in conducting Government
transportation over your road. He will receive from authorized
officers orders for transportation and will order and conduct such
transportation to destination or connecting road. He will report to
me at least once a week the general condition and state of
Government transportation, the conduct of Government Agents on his
road, and report by telegraph of any accident causing stoppage of
Government freight or troops. He will immediately provide a full and
accurate report of the amount and condition of his rolling stock and
the general condition and wants of his road. This information
regarding rolling stock is to enable me to aid those in want, so far
as may be in the power of the Government to supply. |
Only a single copy of this circular
letter has been found and only three copies of reports of rolling
stock and road condition (from the Charleston & Savannah RR,
Richmond & Petersburg RR and Western North Carolina RR) have been
found. It is uncertain whether the presidents of the railroads
cooperated with Wadley's circular, but it seems unlikely since there
is only three reports surviving of what should have been voluminous
letters and telegrams fulfilling the circular's requirements.
However, there is also no evidence of Wadley trying to force
compliance with his circular. |
Regardless of the reception his circular
letter received at the railroads, Wadley energetically worked to
fulfill his promises at the convention. He got the Quartermaster
General to transfer all the rolling stock held by the Quartermaster
Department (some 100+ cars and approximately 27 locomotives) to
Wadley. Also all the B&O RR machinery and supplies that had been
hauled to Raleigh. |
By early March, Wadley had sold
locomotives and cars to several railroads and would continue these
sales for several months. He was also bombarded with transportation
issues from throughout the core Confederacy. He succeeded in getting
the Quartermaster General to issue new transportation forms and
procedures that would speed transportation. |
By April 14, 1863, Wadley was having
discussions with the Secretary of War (James A. Seddon) about the
needs of the railroads for engines and cars and the inability of the
railroads to meet the Government's transportation needs unless the
31 engines and 930 cars he required were supplied. This appears to
be the first time the nation's future railroad needs had been
quantified and laid before the Secretary of War or the President.
Knowing that no locomotives were being manufactured in the South and
only a small number of cars were produced by a handful of roads,
Secretary Seddon must have seen the impossibility of meeting these
requirements and therefore the impossibility of meeting the army's
transportation requirements. |
At this point, there were several
avenues forward -- do nothing and hope things did not turn out as
badly as Wadley had predicted, establish the facilities necessary to
create the required rolling stock, or take rolling stock from
non-essential railroads and put them on essential ones. This last
avenue would require the agreement of Congress (unlikely) or the
liberal use of "military necessity" and impressment of the property
of some of the richest men in the country -- or the Government
taking control of some or all of the core Confederacy railroads. |
Secretary Seddon must have been somewhat
relieved that they would have Wadley running whichever avenue the
President chose. Wadley's name was submitted to the Senate on April
23, 1863, for confirmation of his new rank of Colonel in the
position of Inspector of Railroad Transportation. To the shock of
many, the Military Affairs Committee refused to recommend Wadley's
rank, and therefore his position. |
Government affairs moved slowly and
Wadley only left his position on May 27th. |
|
Captain/Major/Lieutenant Colonel Sims
was the third man to try to make the railroads efficient enough to
supply the needs of the army. He became Wadley's assistant in early
December, 1862 and two months later began a many-month project to
inventory and sell the inventory of Capt. Sharp's Confederate
Locomotive Works in Raleigh. On June 4, 1863, Sims was announced as
replacing Wadley as the superintendent of railroad transportation.
By June 9th, he was deeply involved in the search for corn for
Richmond. On the 10th, he organized a project to move locomotives
from west of Mobile to the east for the use of eastern railroads. |
On July 1st, Sims had published a
statement of the relationship between the railroads and the
Government: "The government does not design interfering with the
management of railroads, but it claims, and the railroads have
conceded, preference in the transportation of its troops and
freights over any and every private interest. It is not expected,
nor is the Government willing that this privilege shall be disturbed
by the transfer of cars or engines from one road to another. Under
any and all circumstances, the Government expects to be first
served, and when this is accomplished, there will be no interruption
to the regular course of transportation for individuals." This was a
very limited expectation from the Government and showed no intention
to assist the railroads in solving their problems. |
On July 9th, Sims was appointed a Major,
the rank being necessary to put him above the Majors who would work
under him (like Hottel, Peters, Whitfield and Whitford). His best
known project was planning and executing Longstreet's move from
Richmond to Chickamauga in the fall of 1863. This success, and the
increasing railroad problems, probably lay behind Sims being
promoted to Lieutenant Colonel on December 19, 1863. |
By October, the new Quartermaster
General A. R. Lawton had written to Sam. Tate (President of the
Memphis & Charleston RR) with the proposal that Tate take the
superintendence of railroads west of the Alabama River because the
superintendence of all the railroads was too much for one man.
Eventually, Major Thomas Peters was assigned that position, with
Tate promising to assisting Peters in all things. |
The construction of the Piedmont RR was
directly under the Engineer Bureau, but its criticality for
supplying Richmond and the ANV was such that Sims had to keep a hand
in the project, especially in providing locomotives for the road
whenever it became operational. |
The corn for Richmond problem surfaced
again in November, with Sims on the hot seat for getting the corn
transported. This problem surfaced again and again through the rest
of the war. |
Sims' other long running problem was
providing detailed men from the army to the railroads. He forwarded
dozens of requests up the chain of command until the very last days.
Starting in January, 1864, requests for rate increases from railroad
companies arrived for Sims with great frequency. |
Since the Confederacy was running on the
avenue of hope for the best, Sims was particularly busy saving
rolling stock from west of Mobile and allocating it to needy roads
as well as buying locomotives from some roads for sale to others,
with the Piedmont RR being especially needy in 1864 and 1865. This
resulted in at least two operations to get western rolling stock to
Mobile, across the Bay, up to Montgomery and repaired to useful
condition. |
Starting in late 1863, Sims had to find
numerous trains to carry Government cotton from Montgomery to
Wilmington to feed the blockade runners. Many roads provided a few
trains when demanded because of reduced requirements for local
services. Cotton Agent Sexius was frequently on the back of the
Secretary of War to ensure he had enough cotton to keep the runners
filled. |
|
Despite the failure of the attempt to
get a useful railroad organization bill passed in the late-spring of
1862, someone decided to try again in January, 1864, probably taking
Sims' recent promotion as a sign that progress might be achieved
this time. On January 5th, Sims responded to an unnamed person with
the following draft of a bill for the establishment of a Railroad
Bureau: |
"1st The Congress of the Confederate States of America does enact
that a Rail Road Bureau is hereby established under the control of one
chief, with the Rank Pay & allowances of a Colonel of Cavalry, with the
assistance of one Inspector in each State of the Confederacy, with the
Rank pay & emoluments of a Major of Cavalry. |
2d It shall be the Duty of the said Chief
to superintend the transportation of all government supplies and troops
in order to facilitate their more rapid concentration, to regulate the
schedules and distribute the Rolling Stock of the various Rail Roads to
meet the needs of the Government, allowing a just compensation for such
necessary transportation, and controlling such Rail Roads, repairing
and, if necessary selling or exchanging all Government machinery,
engines or cars upon the said Rail Road and purchasing such machinery &
material as may be necessary." |
That same day, the Richmond
Whig printed an extensive editorial on the importance of
establishing a Railroad Bureau and providing the iron, supplies and men
necessary to keep the armies supplied. Clearly someone (not Sims) was
trying to solve the railroad problems of the country. The author had
received support in writing his article from someone who understood both
the railroads' problems and detailed solutions that should be addressed
in the hoped for bill. |
On January 8th, Sims sent the
below proposal to a Mr. L. Cruger {unidentified at
present} |
"A Railroad Bureau should be a co-ordinate
branch of the Quarter Master Department but independent of the Q. M.
G. to give its chief greater latitude of action and a more direct
responsibility to government. The business can only be managed by one
who has been educated to it, and is to this extent a speciality
differing from any element heretofore entering into military
operations, and the importance of properly managing transportation,
rapidly concentrating troops or supplies can only be manifest to those
whose daily business enables them to see the difficulties arriving
from a want of control of the movement and trains. My intent is that
the control should not be so much of property as of the movements
thereof and those who operate it. The Chief of the RRB should
therefore have powers to enforce schedules, distribution of rolling
stock from the strong to the weak, sending trains through from one
road to another. He should organize a system of transportation
protecting Govt. stores in transit and yet just to railroad
companies, and should control all officers of gov't connected
therewith. He should regulate the tariff paid for Gov't
transportation, control all cars, engines, or other property desirable
to railroads & owned by gov't should buy, sell, exchange or rent
such machinery with or to any railroad. Captured railroad property
should be turned over to him, disabled machinery should be repaired by
him so far as he could do so to which end he should import the
necessary material & if owned by others the expense of repairs,
collected from them. |
The chief should have the rank, pay, and
allowances of a Colonel of Cavalry, and should be aided by one officer
to act as inspector in each state (with the rank pay and allowances of
a Major of Cavalry) though subject to be ordered anywhere the chief
sees proper, and the various Superintendents should to some extent be
subordinate to him." |
On the back of the letter Sims told Mr. Cruger that
"Within are my ideas expressed crudely & in haste, they embrace the
practical powers that should be conferred on an officer in charge of
railroads." If Sims was pushing for the Bureau, it is clear he did not
provide his Congressional allies with details to sell the proposal. It
therefore is likely that a non-military man was behind the push (though
discussions with the Secretary of War were probable). |
Since the Congressional
Journal for this period is missing, there is little information on what
happened to the bill, but it did not become law. |
|
By early February, 1864, it is
possible to see that Sims was involved in higher level issues than
before -- arranging for repairs to locomotives, reporting on supplying
of Gen. Johnston's army, recommended seizing the iron and rolling stock
from a North Carolina railroad, involved in improving the supply of food
from Georgia to Richmond, and offering to sell ten new cars to a road. |
How could Sims solve the
problems listed at the top of this article? |
|
Problem |
|
Status in early 1864 |
|
1. Insufficient rolling stock |
|
Worse than ever |
|
2. Many roads did not connect in cities |
|
Mostly resolved (cities lost and connections
created) |
|
3. No manufacturer of rails, rolling stock and
other railroad supplies |
|
Slight improvement (Tredegar was making some
wheels, axles and spikes) |
|
4. Insufficient sources of iron and other
essential metals |
|
No improvement |
|
5. Lack of redundant east-west and north-south
routes |
|
Small improvement completed and another in
process |
|
6. Schedules not coordinated to provide the
fastest possible travel |
|
Much improved |
|
7. Few lines of railroads serving the likely
areas of combat |
|
Improvements in progress (only Piedmont RR would
be completed) |
|
8. The belief by the government that the
railroads should handle their own problems |
|
Unchanged, except as Sims was able to provide
government resources |
|
9. Most railroads were partially, or wholly,
owned by their states |
|
No change |
|
10. Railroads were unwilling to loose control
over their rolling stock |
|
"Military necessity" forced much more
interchange of cars with neighboring roads |
|
11. Devotion to "State's Rights" would prevent
prompt agreement to solve railroad problems |
|
No change |
|
12. Lack of labor for the many construction
projects that would be required |
|
No change |
|
13. Lack of coin and currency to pay the huge
costs of the war, including transportation |
|
No change |
|
|
Meeting the needs of the army
(and Richmond) required four resources at this late date: more cars,
more locomotives, more skilled men and useable rails. |
Locomotives could only be
provided by rescuing some from Mississippi and repairing those out of
service. The criticality of repairing locomotives was so obvious that
various railroads did the work for other roads, as long as raw material
could be provided by Sims. Sims got the Navy to repair some locomotives
in the Charlotte Navy Yard, but the results were not impressive. |
Skilled men were slowly
released from the armies to details to various railroads, but the armies
would soon be bled terribly in the summer battles. |
Poor repairs of old rails
continued to be the best hope for rails, unless the army and navy
allowed Tredegar to make rails (which they never did before the loss of
the Virginia iron mines made that irrelevant). |
Only the creation of new cars
had some hope of improving the situation. Records exist for the
Government construction of 133 box cars and 11 flat cars during the war
(compared to the 12,500 cars on the railroads east of the Mississippi
during the war (ie 1% of the cars used)). There were offers to produce
other cars, but no indication that those offers were accepted and cars
produced. But Sims finally managed to convince the government to make a
meaningful number of cars for government use -- especially for the
transfer of troops when company cars were occupied carrying government
food and other essential supplies. Sims created a plan for the
construction of 225 cars, devised a plan for supervision of construction
and acceptance of completed of cars, and the production of the required
iron parts. One year after the agreement to produce had been made, not a
single car appears to have been accepted by the government (enemy raids,
shortage of men, higher government priorities, loss of iron mines were
the primary reasons for the failure to make the plan work). |
In other words, by early 1864,
it was too late for the railroads and government to improve the
transportation problems -- unless the government took over the
railroads, eliminated most private transportation and redistributed
rolling stock and rails as necessary for the good of the army. This
proposal had been hinted at in various convention proposals and
proposals for new laws. The major opponents to the government control
(stated or de facto) were the President of the Confederacy and the
Governors of several states. A Congressional law allowing this control
over the railroads was finally passed on February 25, 1865 -- to take
effect February 25, 1866. |
Had the railroads seen the
future, back in early 1862, and used their Presidents' position and
prestige to lobby President Davis, there is only the slightest chance
that such a law could have been passed. The Confederate Constitution
prohibited the government becoming involved in public works projects --
and assisting railroads was considered one of the actions forbidden,
with the only escape clause being "military necessity." That prohibition
in the Constitution, and its adherence by the Confederacy's leaders, is
what killed the ability of the railroads to provide the support for the
government and armies that the railroads could have provided. Only a
crash project to build rolling mills and foundries, to support the
required iron mines and to release from the army the skilled manpower
needed to repair and build rolling stock and produce iron track could
have had a chance of changing the course of the war. Such a crash
project had created the impressive results of the Confederate Ordnance
Bureau, but no such Josiah Gorgas appeared in the War Department for
railroad needs, thus the Government never took control of the railroads. |
|
Some References |
|
Power to control RRs |
NA, JC
8-21-61 |
1861 Convention |
OR Series 4, Vol. 2, Page 499 |
Control certain RRs 1/29/62 |
OR Series 4, Vol. 1, Page 884 |
1862 Convention |
LVA, RR 2-5-62 |
Bad precedent in aiding RR construction |
NP, REX
2-7B-62 |
Bill passed |
NP, MAP
5-4B-62 |
Pre-Wadley control needs 8/12/62 |
OR Series 4, Vol. 2, Page 48 |
Wadley's First Convention |
NA, RRB
12-15-62 |
Wadley's Circular |
OR Series 4, Vol. 2, Page 270 |
Rolling stock required 4/14/63 |
OR Series 4, Vol. 2, Page 483
OR Series 4, Vol. 2, Page 487 |
Sims' relationship statement |
NA, RRB
7-1-63 |
Sims' view of RRs 10/23/63 |
OR Series 4, Vol. 2, Page 881
NA, RRB 1-8A-64 |
Sims' idea for RR Bureau |
NA, RRB
1-5-64 |
Richmond Whig editorial |
NP, RW
1-5-64 |
Sims on improving service 3/64 |
OR
Series 4, Vol. 3, Page 226 |
Law controlling RRs |
B28, LAW
2-28-65 |
|
|
Journal of the Confederate Congress |
V p 82, 122, II p.87 V p. 251-253
V p. 152, 188, 215, 253-4, 269 II p.195, 198, 215 |
|
|
Also see
Conventions,
Biographies of Ashe,
Wadley,
Sims |