Government Control of Confederate Railroads
   An impartial observer could have easily seen the major weaknesses of the Confederate railroads at the start of the war:
  1. Insufficient rolling stock
  2. Many roads did not connect in cities
  3. No manufacturer of rails, rolling stock and other railroad supplies
  4. Insufficient sources of iron and other essential metals
  5. Lack of redundant east-west and north-south routes
  6. Schedules not coordinated to provide the fastest possible travel
  7. Few lines of railroads serving the likely areas of combat
  8. The belief by the government that the railroads should handle their own problems

   Other weaknesses were just as important, but not so obvious:
  9. Most railroads were partially, or wholly, owned by their states
  10. Railroads were unwilling to loose control over their rolling stock
  11. Devotion to "State's Rights" would prevent prompt agreement to solve railroad problems
  12. Lack of labor for the many construction projects that would be required
  13. Lack of coin and currency to pay the huge costs of the war, including transportation
   Each of the above weaknesses would provide serious obstacles to keeping the Confederate armies and cities supplied with the essentials for winning the war.
   President Davis had the issues of railroads impressed on him during his trip from Montgomery to Richmond in late May, 1861. The trip required travel over 8 railroad companies' tracks, one change of gage, at least 5 changes of cars and one ferry ride. He had travel 850 miles to cover a trip that would require 690 miles on today's interstate highway system. The extra 160 miles, along with the gage/car changes and ferry trip, would have required one entire day longer than would have been required if the railroads had been built for long distance travel (such as Richmond to New Orleans).
   Unfortunately for the Confederacy, Davis was immediately swamped with military matters, especially the anticipated Union  advance on Richmond, and did not give railroad matters attention until July 18th, when Davis appointed Wilmington & Weldon RR President William S. Ashe as the first superintendent of transportation of troops and military stores on all the rail roads, north and south, in the Confederate States.
 
   Ashe quickly found that a presidential appointment did not confer the authority necessary to accomplish his mission of providing the necessary transportation for the army. Of the above problems, only #6 was one he could directly influence. Of the others, Ashe's political experience allowed him to impact #1, but only slightly, and #'s 9, 10, and 11 stymied him.
   The first serious attempt to improve the support for the railroads' operations surfaced during the December 1861 meeting in Richmond of the President and Superintendents of the Virginia and North Carolina railroads. After assigning tasks, the convention meet again in early January to finalize their proposals. As was the understanding of how business and government should relate to each other, Ashe was not invited to the meeting. The convention provided a written report to the Secretary of War so that their could be better coordination between private and public efforts. Half way down the report was the proposal that the government provide capacity at private mines and foundries to allow those works to handle railroad requirements. Next came the useless proposal that private investors should build foundries and rolling mills and should received Government assistance (money only was mentioned). Of course, the higher prices required for the small Southern new construction to operate would make these businesses too expensive for success after the war and would quickly fail.
   A much more serious convention was quickly called and met February 5-7, with Major Ashe participating. This meeting included representatives from several western railroads, as well as the eastern ones. The primary proposal approved by the convention was the division of the railroad system into four divisions, each of which would establish a rolling mill and such machine shops and foundries as required by that division. The railroads of each division would fund the creation of the rolling mill for that division and the presidents of those railroads would act as the Board of Directors for the mill. Nothing was mentioned about the government allowing the mines to provide metal for their work nor the government allowing men to be released from the army to man the new works. The plan developed was reasonable, and could have made a significant impact on railroad operations --- IF the government had been whole-heartedly behind it, providing men, materials and transportation to support the mills.
   It was clear to someone (Ashe?) that letting the railroads "do their own thing" was not going to meet the needs of the nation. Ashe's experiences with five railroad conventions convinced someone to write a proposed bill for a reorganization of the railroads' support to the army. As explained by Black in The Railroads of the Confederacy, pp. 97-98, in mid-March, 1862, both the Confederate House and Senate passed resolutions directing the Military Affairs Committees "to inquire whether further legislation is necessary to give increased efficiency to our interior lines of railroads."
   The House Committee was the first to report out a Bill -- the first attempt by the Congress to provide a scheme of railroad regulation. Its clauses were enough to delight those desiring centralized control. They provided for "a military chief of railroad transportation," with the rank of lieutenant colonel, to be appointed by the President from the railroad officers of the Confederacy on the basis of judgment, skill, and experience in practical transportation matters. As his immediate assistants a number of district military superintendents were to be selected, each to hold the rank of Major and to be charged with the supervision of a specific portion of the railroad system. The bill would invest all railroad officials with military rank, and military responsibilities, to and including conductors, station agents, and section masters. It required the establishment of through schedules for government freight and the interchange of cars under public control.
   As Black states, this was a real attack on the problem, though who devised the system and assisted in writing the bill remains unknown, though both Ashe and William M. Wadley (the next army railroad superintendent) were both in Richmond and may well have worked on the bill together. After the Bill's presentation to the House, a torrent of abuse was unleashed on the concepts behind the bill, resulting eventually in the complete gutting of the bill's twelve sections, reducing them to one. The emasculated bill was passed and sent to the Senate, where it died a quiet death with the end of the session of the Congress.
 
   As the summer of 1862 arrived, the Confederacy had no one in specific "control" over the nation's railroads -- Ashe had resigned and Colonel Myers, the Quartermaster General determined to handle transportation matters himself, with Captain Mason Morfit (a lawyer) as his only assistant.
   To no surprise, the railroad issues increased in number and seriousness. The deterioration of the railroads had not become serious, but refusing to solve basic problems made them worse. Several critical railroad construction projects were started by the government, but the assistance the government could provide was not forthcoming and the railroads felt they had no advocate in Richmond.
   On August 12, Secretary of War G. W. Randolph wrote President Davis on the status of the War Department and matters that would need attention. His last of a long item was "A right to control the operations of our railroads to some extent is necessary to insure quick and safe transportation and to maintain the roads in a proper state of efficiency. The regular transportation of the roads is so much deranged by the movements of troops and munitions of war that a common head during the war is indispensable. I recommend that application be made for authority to exercise such control as may be necessary to harmonize the operations of the roads and to maintain their efficiency, and to appoint a superintendent who shall be charged with the supervision of railroad transportation."
 
   By November, 1862, the transportation issue had become too serious to ignore and President Davis, through the Secretary of War, called Wadley to Richmond to discuss his taking the position of Superintendent of Rail Road Transportation. He accepted and immediately called for a convention of all railroad presidents and superintendents in Augusta on December 15.
   Forty-one railroads attended, covering 5,181 miles of track. The chairman read AIG's Special Order 98, assigning Wadley to take supervision and control of the transportation for the Government on all the Rail Roads in the Confederate States. He would make contracts with the railroads and make regulations and arrangements with them as required to secure harmony and cooperation the part of the railroads. He would direct all agents or employees hired by the Government in connection with railroad transportation, take charge of and employ all engineers, machinery, tools and other property of the Government owned or used for railroad transportation and may exchange, sell or loan such machinery to facilitate the work of transportation. He could require cooperation and assistance to such an extent as can be reasonably granted by the Quartermaster and Commissary Bureaus and may apply for details from the army for such mechanics and workmen as may be necessary to facilitate his duties. He would report through the Adjutant and Inspector General to the Secretary of War.
   Having read the orders to Col. Wadley, the chair then read Wadley's letter to the convention, in which he said the convention had been called to present the railroads' difficulties in providing transportation and to work out ways to meet those problems. He specifically called for coordination of schedules to arrange for connections that delayed transportation as little as possible. He proposed to part with all rolling stock the Government had to those roads most in need of additional rolling stock. He requested railroads with plenty of rolling stock to assist nearby roads that were short of such stock. He requested the roads should form an agreement regarding interchange between roads and, once the agreement had been agreed to, it would be rigidly enforced. He also asked the convention not to adjourn before the issues raised had been fully resolved.
   The convention then took up the business of most importance to the railroads -- setting new freight rates and improving punctuality of Government payment for freight and passengers carried.
   Once the money issues had been settled, several resolutions were adopted by the convention. First, the Superintendents of the rail roads would act as assistants to Wadley on matters concerning their roads. Second, those roads partially in the hands of the enemy, or greatly destroyed by them, and those in the Trans-Mississippi were exempted from the rate agreement just made.
   The convention then pledged to work with Wadley to solve issues that would arrive, and then the convention adjourned. But the railroads appeared to have been wary of government assistance, as nothing had been done on the government side to support the creation of the rolling mills proposed eight months before. The railroads had, in several small conventions, made steps to locate the sites for the rolling mills, but nothing had progressed from there (there being no railroad superintendent at the government level during those months to keep the momentum going).
   Wadley's frustration over the convention's hasty adjournment and the refusal to work out the specific problems and their solutions came to the surface in a circular letter to all the railroad presidents who had attended, dated the day after the convention adjourned. "Having failed at the recent meeting of Presidents and Superintendents of Railroads in the Confederate States, to agree upon a definite plan for carrying on Government Transportation, over the several Railroads of the country, and deeming it of the first importance that some system should be agreed upon, by which all will act in harmony, I respectfully submit and ask your concurrence and agreement to the following:"
   Your superintendent will act as my assistant, without compensation, in conducting Government transportation over your road. He will receive from authorized officers orders for transportation and will order and conduct such transportation to destination or connecting road. He will report to me at least once a week the general condition and state of Government transportation, the conduct of Government Agents on his road, and report by telegraph of any accident causing stoppage of Government freight or troops. He will immediately provide a full and accurate report of the amount and condition of his rolling stock and the general condition and wants of his road. This information regarding rolling stock is to enable me to aid those in want, so far as may be in the power of the Government to supply.
   Only a single copy of this circular letter has been found and only three copies of reports of rolling stock and road condition (from the Charleston & Savannah RR, Richmond & Petersburg RR and Western North Carolina RR) have been found. It is uncertain whether the presidents of the railroads cooperated with Wadley's circular, but it seems unlikely since there is only three reports surviving of what should have been voluminous letters and telegrams fulfilling the circular's requirements. However, there is also no evidence of Wadley trying to force compliance with his circular.
   Regardless of the reception his circular letter received at the railroads, Wadley energetically worked to fulfill his promises at the convention. He got the Quartermaster General to transfer all the rolling stock held by the Quartermaster Department (some 100+ cars and approximately 27 locomotives) to Wadley. Also all the B&O RR machinery and supplies that had been hauled to Raleigh.
   By early March, Wadley had sold locomotives and cars to several railroads and would continue these sales for several months. He was also bombarded with transportation issues from throughout the core Confederacy. He succeeded in getting the Quartermaster General to issue new transportation forms and procedures that would speed transportation.
   By April 14, 1863, Wadley was having discussions with the Secretary of War (James A. Seddon) about the needs of the railroads for engines and cars and the inability of the railroads to meet the Government's transportation needs unless the 31 engines and 930 cars he required were supplied. This appears to be the first time the nation's future railroad needs had been quantified and laid before the Secretary of War or the President. Knowing that no locomotives were being manufactured in the South and only a small number of cars were produced by a handful of roads, Secretary Seddon must have seen the impossibility of meeting these requirements and therefore the impossibility of meeting the army's transportation requirements.
   At this point, there were several avenues forward -- do nothing and hope things did not turn out as badly as Wadley had predicted, establish the facilities necessary to create the required rolling stock, or take rolling stock from non-essential railroads and put them on essential ones. This last avenue would require the agreement of Congress (unlikely) or the liberal use of "military necessity" and impressment of the property of some of the richest men in the country -- or the Government taking control of some or all of the core Confederacy railroads.
   Secretary Seddon must have been somewhat relieved that they would have Wadley running whichever avenue the President chose. Wadley's name was submitted to the Senate on April 23, 1863, for confirmation of his new rank of Colonel in the position of Inspector of Railroad Transportation. To the shock of many, the Military Affairs Committee refused to recommend Wadley's rank, and therefore his position.
   Government affairs moved slowly and Wadley only left his position on May 27th.
 
   Captain/Major/Lieutenant Colonel Sims was the third man to try to make the railroads efficient enough to supply the needs of the army. He became Wadley's assistant in early December, 1862 and two months later began a many-month project to inventory and sell the inventory of Capt. Sharp's Confederate Locomotive Works in Raleigh. On June 4, 1863, Sims was announced as replacing Wadley as the superintendent of railroad transportation. By June 9th, he was deeply involved in the search for corn for Richmond. On the 10th, he organized a project to move locomotives from west of Mobile to the east for the use of eastern railroads.
   On July 1st, Sims had published a statement of the relationship between the railroads and the Government: "The government does not design interfering with the management of railroads, but it claims, and the railroads have conceded, preference in the transportation of its troops and freights over any and every private interest. It is not expected, nor is the Government willing that this privilege shall be disturbed by the transfer of cars or engines from one road to another. Under any and all circumstances, the Government expects to be first served, and when this is accomplished, there will be no interruption to the regular course of transportation for individuals." This was a very limited expectation from the Government and showed no intention to assist the railroads in solving their problems.
   On July 9th, Sims was appointed a Major, the rank being necessary to put him above the Majors who would work under him (like Hottel, Peters, Whitfield and Whitford). His best known project was planning and executing Longstreet's move from Richmond to Chickamauga in the fall of 1863. This success, and the increasing railroad problems, probably lay behind Sims being promoted to Lieutenant Colonel on December 19, 1863.
   By October, the new Quartermaster General A. R. Lawton had written to Sam. Tate (President of the Memphis & Charleston RR) with the proposal that Tate take the superintendence of railroads west of the Alabama River because the superintendence of all the railroads was too much for one man. Eventually, Major Thomas Peters was assigned that position, with Tate promising to assisting Peters in all things.
   The construction of the Piedmont RR was directly under the Engineer Bureau, but its criticality for supplying Richmond and the ANV was such that Sims had to keep a hand in the project, especially in providing locomotives for the road whenever it became operational.
   The corn for Richmond problem surfaced again in November, with Sims on the hot seat for getting the corn transported. This problem surfaced again and again through the rest of the war.
   Sims' other long running problem was providing detailed men from the army to the railroads. He forwarded dozens of requests up the chain of command until the very last days. Starting in January, 1864, requests for rate increases from railroad companies arrived for Sims with great frequency.
   Since the Confederacy was running on the avenue of hope for the best, Sims was particularly busy saving rolling stock from west of Mobile and allocating it to needy roads as well as buying locomotives from some roads for sale to others, with the Piedmont RR being especially needy in 1864 and 1865. This resulted in at least two operations to get western rolling stock to Mobile, across the Bay, up to Montgomery and repaired to useful condition.
   Starting in late 1863, Sims had to find numerous trains to carry Government cotton from Montgomery to Wilmington to feed the blockade runners. Many roads provided a few trains when demanded because of reduced requirements for local services. Cotton Agent Sexius was frequently on the back of the Secretary of War to ensure he had enough cotton to keep the runners filled.
 
   Despite the failure of the attempt to get a useful railroad organization bill passed in the late-spring of 1862, someone decided to try again in January, 1864, probably taking Sims' recent promotion as a sign that progress might be achieved this time. On January 5th, Sims responded to an unnamed person with the following draft of a bill for the establishment of a Railroad Bureau:
   "1st The Congress of the Confederate States of America does enact that a Rail Road Bureau is hereby established under the control of one chief, with the Rank Pay & allowances of a Colonel of Cavalry, with the assistance of one Inspector in each State of the Confederacy, with the Rank pay & emoluments of a Major of Cavalry.
   2d It shall be the Duty of the said Chief to superintend the transportation of all government supplies and troops in order to facilitate their more rapid concentration, to regulate the schedules and distribute the Rolling Stock of the various Rail Roads to meet the needs of the Government, allowing a just compensation for such necessary transportation, and controlling such Rail Roads, repairing and, if necessary selling or exchanging all Government machinery, engines or cars upon the said Rail Road and purchasing such machinery & material as may be necessary."
   That same day, the Richmond Whig printed an extensive editorial on the importance of establishing a Railroad Bureau and providing the iron, supplies and men necessary to keep the armies supplied. Clearly someone (not Sims) was trying to solve the railroad problems of the country. The author had received support in writing his article from someone who understood both the railroads' problems and detailed solutions that should be addressed in the hoped for bill.
   On January 8th, Sims sent the below proposal to a Mr. L. Cruger {unidentified at present}
   "A Railroad Bureau should be a co-ordinate branch of the Quarter Master Department but independent of the Q. M. G. to give its chief greater latitude of action and a more direct responsibility to government. The business can only be managed by one who has been educated to it, and is to this extent a speciality differing from any element heretofore entering into military operations, and the importance of properly managing transportation, rapidly concentrating troops or supplies can only be manifest to those whose daily business enables them to see the difficulties arriving from a want of control of the movement and trains. My intent is that the control should not be so much of property as of the movements thereof and those who operate it. The Chief of the RRB should therefore have powers to enforce schedules, distribution of rolling stock from the strong to the weak, sending trains through from one road to another. He should organize a system of transportation protecting Govt. stores in transit and yet just to railroad companies, and should control all officers of gov't connected therewith. He should regulate the tariff paid for Gov't transportation, control all cars, engines, or other property desirable to railroads & owned by gov't should buy, sell, exchange or rent such machinery with or to any railroad. Captured railroad property should be turned over to him, disabled machinery should be repaired by him so far as he could do so to which end he should import the necessary material & if owned by others the expense of repairs, collected from them.
   The chief should have the rank, pay, and allowances of a Colonel of Cavalry, and should be aided by one officer to act as inspector in each state (with the rank pay and allowances of a Major of Cavalry) though subject to be ordered anywhere the chief sees proper, and the various Superintendents should to some extent be subordinate to him."
   On the back of the letter Sims told Mr. Cruger that "Within are my ideas expressed crudely & in haste, they embrace the practical powers that should be conferred on an officer in charge of railroads." If Sims was pushing for the Bureau, it is clear he did not provide his Congressional allies with details to sell the proposal. It therefore is likely that a non-military man was behind the push (though discussions with the Secretary of War were probable).
   Since the Congressional Journal for this period is missing, there is little information on what happened to the bill, but it did not become law.
  
   By early February, 1864, it is possible to see that Sims was involved in higher level issues than before -- arranging for repairs to locomotives, reporting on supplying of Gen. Johnston's army, recommended seizing the iron and rolling stock from a North Carolina railroad, involved in improving the supply of food from Georgia to Richmond, and offering to sell ten new cars to a road.
   How could Sims solve the problems listed at the top of this article?
 

Problem

  

Status in early 1864
  1. Insufficient rolling stock   Worse than ever
  2. Many roads did not connect in cities   Mostly resolved (cities lost and connections created)
  3. No manufacturer of rails, rolling stock and other railroad supplies   Slight improvement (Tredegar was making some wheels, axles and spikes)
  4. Insufficient sources of iron and other essential metals   No improvement
  5. Lack of redundant east-west and north-south routes   Small improvement completed and another in process
  6. Schedules not coordinated to provide the fastest possible travel   Much improved
  7. Few lines of railroads serving the likely areas of combat   Improvements in progress (only Piedmont RR would be completed)
  8. The belief by the government that the railroads should handle their own problems   Unchanged, except as Sims was able to provide government resources
  9. Most railroads were partially, or wholly, owned by their states   No change
  10. Railroads were unwilling to loose control over their rolling stock   "Military necessity" forced much more interchange of cars with neighboring roads
  11. Devotion to "State's Rights" would prevent prompt agreement to solve railroad problems   No change
  12. Lack of labor for the many construction projects that would be required   No change
  13. Lack of coin and currency to pay the huge costs of the war, including transportation   No change

  

   Meeting the needs of the army (and Richmond) required four resources at this late date: more cars, more locomotives, more skilled men and useable rails.
   Locomotives could only be provided by rescuing some from Mississippi and repairing those out of service. The criticality of repairing locomotives was so obvious that various railroads did the work for other roads, as long as raw material could be provided by Sims. Sims got the Navy to repair some locomotives in the Charlotte Navy Yard, but the results were not impressive.
   Skilled men were slowly released from the armies to details to various railroads, but the armies would soon be bled terribly in the summer battles.
   Poor repairs of old rails continued to be the best hope for rails, unless the army and navy allowed Tredegar to make rails (which they never did before the loss of the Virginia iron mines made that irrelevant).
   Only the creation of new cars had some hope of improving the situation. Records exist for the Government construction of 133 box cars and 11 flat cars during the war (compared to the 12,500 cars on the railroads east of the Mississippi during the war (ie 1% of the cars used)). There were offers to produce other cars, but no indication that those offers were accepted and cars produced. But Sims finally managed to convince the government to make a meaningful number of cars for government use -- especially for the transfer of troops when company cars were occupied carrying government food and other essential supplies. Sims created a plan for the construction of 225 cars, devised a plan for supervision of construction and acceptance of completed of cars, and the production of the required iron parts. One year after the agreement to produce had been made, not a single car appears to have been accepted by the government (enemy raids, shortage of men, higher government priorities, loss of iron mines were the primary reasons for the failure to make the plan work).
   In other words, by early 1864, it was too late for the railroads and government to improve the transportation problems -- unless the government took over the railroads, eliminated most private transportation and redistributed rolling stock and rails as necessary for the good of the army. This proposal had been hinted at in various convention proposals and proposals for new laws. The major opponents to the government control (stated or de facto) were the President of the Confederacy and the Governors of several states. A Congressional law allowing this control over the railroads was finally passed on February 25, 1865 -- to take effect February 25, 1866.
   Had the railroads seen the future, back in early 1862, and used their Presidents' position and prestige to lobby President Davis, there is only the slightest chance that such a law could have been passed. The Confederate Constitution prohibited the government becoming involved in public works projects -- and assisting railroads was considered one of the actions forbidden, with the only escape clause being "military necessity." That prohibition in the Constitution, and its adherence by the Confederacy's leaders, is what killed the ability of the railroads to provide the support for the government and armies that the railroads could have provided. Only a crash project to build rolling mills and foundries, to support the required iron mines and to release from the army the skilled manpower needed to repair and build rolling stock and produce iron track could have had a chance of changing the course of the war. Such a crash project had created the impressive results of the Confederate Ordnance Bureau, but no such Josiah Gorgas appeared in the War Department for railroad needs, thus the Government never took control of the railroads.
 

Some References
 
Power to control RRs NA, JC 8-21-61
1861 Convention OR Series 4, Vol. 2, Page 499
Control certain RRs 1/29/62 OR Series 4, Vol. 1, Page 884
1862 Convention LVA, RR 2-5-62
Bad precedent in aiding RR construction NP, REX 2-7B-62
Bill passed NP, MAP 5-4B-62
Pre-Wadley control needs 8/12/62 OR Series 4, Vol. 2, Page 48
Wadley's First Convention NA, RRB 12-15-62
Wadley's Circular OR Series 4, Vol. 2, Page 270
Rolling stock required 4/14/63 OR Series 4, Vol. 2, Page 483    OR Series 4, Vol. 2, Page 487
Sims' relationship statement NA, RRB 7-1-63
Sims' view of RRs  10/23/63 OR Series 4, Vol. 2, Page 881  NA, RRB 1-8A-64
Sims' idea for RR Bureau NA, RRB 1-5-64
Richmond Whig editorial NP, RW 1-5-64
Sims on improving service  3/64 OR Series 4, Vol. 3, Page 226
Law controlling RRs B28, LAW 2-28-65
   
Journal of the Confederate Congress V p 82, 122, II p.87   V p. 251-253    V p. 152, 188, 215, 253-4, 269   II p.195, 198, 215
 
Also see Conventions, Biographies of Ashe, Wadley, Sims

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