Supplies Brought Through the Blockade

The Confederate government refused to buy or transport railroad supplies from Europe. The railroads were advised to send their own people to buy and ship for themselves. This policy was only relented when the Seaboard & Roanoke Railroad's Superintendent was sent to England as an Army officer to purchase Engineer Department supplies and was allowed to buy for 5 Virginia railroads while he was there {NA, ENG 1-27-63, NA, ENG 2-26-63}. See Piedmont Railroad Blockage Running Plans. In 1864, Congress allowed importation of railroad materials duty free AOC, 5-23-64. 

It is also possible that in 1864 rails were purchased and shipped to Nassau {here}. The newspaper editorial that says that rails were in Nassau does not hedge his statement. The editor was clearly well informed on railroad matters and may have received information on the importation of rails from Capt. C. C. Sims, Railroad Bureau officer in Macon.

Only 6 railroad's blockade running activities have been located. The Macon & Western Imports are railroad specific -- boiler plate, tires, and steam gages -- while the Western North Carolina Imports show the lack of almost everything in the Confederacy -- paint, oil, tin, screws, tacks, and belting for industrial engines. South Carolina Imports only mentions tires and unspecified equipment (probably for the new shops being created in Columbia). Virginia Central Imports and Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac POA provide details of the financing. Western & Atlantic Imports makes a vague reference to imports received, but not yet paid for. The Wilmington & Manchester mentions English rails purchased and laid down, but the reference may be to the rails purchased from Tredegar.

It is likely that other railroads made purchases in England for shipment through the blockade. The President of the Cheraw & Darlington cashed two L1,000 checks in London in December 1862. It seems likely that he would buy supplies for his own road while there, but his 40-mile long road was unlikely to have sent him on its own account -- perhaps he purchased the tires and equipment, mentioned above, that was sent in to the South Carolina RR. Additionally, the Northeastern mentions in its April 1863 Annual Report that "some months ago contracts were entered into for the delivery at any accessible Confederate port, of certain articles most needed by us, but they have not yet been complied with and we question whether they will ever be received."

Governor Vance appears to have allowed North Carolina railroads to ship small quantities of cotton on the North Carolina's blockade runner "Vance." The results of this arrangement are unknown. Likewise, the results of the Georgia RR's attempt {and} to get space on Confederate Government runners is unknown.

Whatever blockade running efforts were made, it was clear, even to a remote newspaper editor {here}, that the railroads had made but few efforts to increase their stock of supplies through 1863.

It is possible that some western railroads traded through the lines late in the war {here}.

The failure of the Confederate government to control the purchase and importation of railroad supplies is no more difficult to believe than the rest of the blockade running and railroad stories. With only a little forethought and effort, locomotive tires, car wheels, car axles, tin (for bearings), and rails could have been imported with very minor impact on the supplies received for the rest of the war effort.

In the case of locomotive tires, the 1,500 Southern locomotives would require about 2,000 iron tires a year. (Iron tires lasted about 60,000 miles; steel ones lasted 200,000, but were much more expensive.) Some tires were imported, some were made by Tredegar, and some were made by the larger and better equipped railroads -- but the deficit left caused many locomotives to be taken out of service as the war got to 1864.

For rails, the possible solution is also painfully obvious. According to Stephen Wise, about 210 blockade runners made it into ports from Mobile to Wilmington in 1863. Another 230 made it in during 1864. If only 10% of that 440 runners had each carried 20 tons (about 5% of their cargo capacity) of 55# rail, some 18 miles of new rail could have been available to maintain the essential rail lines. This would have cost only 1/2 of 1% of the cargo capacity of these ships in their 440 runs. If another 1/2 of 1% of their capacity had been used for other railroad supplies, the results would have been significant.

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